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Introduction
Between 1974 1 This act permits interested parties to petition the USITC for relief from injurious but fair foreign competition.
Any relief granted is intended as a temporary measure, providing the industry with time to adjust to changing circumstances.
Of the 73 completed investigations, 40 resulted in affirmative findings by the
Commission. After forwarding their recommendations to the President of the United
States, 24 of these cases resulted in some form of import relief, almost half of which as recommended by the Commission, with the remainder being modified by the President.
As the excerpts from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards and the USITC indicate, safeguard measures are intended, in part, to facilitate adjustment to changes in the international environment. Adjustment typically entails becoming "leaner and meaner" to more effectively compete in the international marketplace. As such, part of "facilitating adjustment" can be viewed as providing time so that resources can be withdrawn from declining industries in an orderly fashion. It has been suggested that the government may also have equity considerations in mind when providing such relief, as this passage from Baldwin (1989) clearly articulates:
Other authors stressing the income distribution goals of government, like Cheh (1974) and Lavergne (1983) argue that trade policies of governments are motivated by a desire to minimize (or delay) adjustment costs, especially to workers. In examining the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Cheh found a pattern of low tariff cuts in industries with high proportions of elderly workers, declining employment, and rising import penetration ratios.
By providing temporary protection, the government gives young workers time to retrain and make a smooth transition to the growing export sectors while simultaneously softening the blow to the older workers who face bleak reemployment prospects if they try to change their occupation so late in life.
Our goal in this paper is to explore the efficiency consequences of using temporary protection to smooth out the adjustment process following an unexpected, permanent improvement in a country's terms of trade. 2 We assume that the government's primary motivation in providing such relief is two-fold. First, it is intended to either reduce or delay the adjustment costs imposed on the young workers who switch occupations as a result of the terms of trade shock. Second, it is intended to lessen the blow to the older workers who find that they regret decisions made earlier in life because they could not anticipate the improvement in the terms of trade.
Thus, while the government's primary motives may be equity driven, our goal is to 2 Thus, our approach differs, in a fundamental way, from the equity-based explanation of temporary protection offered by Deardorff (1987) and the political economy explanation offered by Sykes (1991) . Deardorff bases his explanation on Corden's Conservative Social Welfare Function and argues that the government's objective is to prevent a significant fall in real income of a significant sector of the economy. In his setting, safegaurd policies "are not intended, as economists more often recommend, to facilitate 'adjustment' in the sense of an orderly transition to a new equilibrium" (Deardorff 1987, p. 24) . In contrast, the Sykes approach emphasizes that policy makers may experience a change in political support when the terms of trade change and it is therefore in their interest to respond to this change with newly adopted measures of temporary protection. Our analysis is, in no way, meant to dismiss such alternative explanations of temporary safeguard policies. Instead, our goal is to show that if the government is concerned about adjustment, as has been emphasized by a variety of authors in the past, there may be efficiency as well as equity concerns driving their decisions.
assess the welfare consequences of government's actions. 3 We do so in the context of a simple overlapping-generations model where all newborn agents must decide whether to seek employment in the export sector or the import-competing sector. In making their choice, agents tradeoff the potentially higher wage that the export sector has to offer with a lower probability of actually finding a job in that sector. Since young agents have a longer time horizon, more young workers than old choose to search for jobs in the export sector. An unexpected improvement in the terms of trade surprises old workers who cannot undo the decisions they made while young. As a result, some old workers who had not planned to search for work in the export sector end up changing their plans, adding to the pool of searchers. As the pool of searchers in the export sector swells, congestion externalities may arise, making it harder to secure employment. This is particularly harmful to old workers since they have less time left to find new jobs than their younger counterparts. By providing temporary protection, the government can stem the tide of searchers, reduce congestion and make the transition to the new steady state smoother.
We are not the first to examine the broad issue of trade and adjustment costs, nor even the first to examine the more narrowly defined issue of temporary protection and adjustment costs. There are several empirical studies of the size and scope of adjustment cots (e.g., Magee 1972; Baldwin, Mutti and Richradson 1980; and more recently Trefler 2001) as well as theoretical work that emphasizes the importance of taking the adjustment process into account when making welfare judgments (e.g., Mayer 1974 , Mussa 1974 Neary 1978 and more recently Davidson and Matusz 2001) . More directly relevant to this paper are the studies that derive the optimal policy path for liberalization in the presence of adjustment costs (Cassing and Ochs 3 While we are concerned with the efficiency implications of temporary protection, we make no attempt 1978; Lapan 1976 Lapan , 1978 Lapan , 1979 Michealy 1986; Mussa 1982; Pindyk 1982 and Ray 1979; Karp and Paul 1994 and Gaisford and Leger 2000 . 4 One key insight from this research is that in the absence of factor market distortions, there is no justification on efficiency grounds for gradual liberalization. However, if there are factor market imperfections then some sort of government intervention, either in the form of temporary protection or some sort of labor market policy, is warranted.
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Several of these papers focus on congestion externalities as the source of the factor market distortion. Cassing and Ochs (1978) provide an explicit model of the search process and show that the market-induced rate of adjustment is sub-optimal when congestion externalities are present. In contrast, Paul (1994, 1998) and Gaisford and Leger (2000) do not model the source of the externality -they simply assume that the social cost of adjustment exceeds the private cost of adjustment. Both papers then show that government intervention can raise welfare, although Paul (1994, 1998) focus on tariff policy while Gaisford and Leger (2000) argue that there are always superior policies available.
Our work is similar to Karp and Paul' s in that we show that if a change in the terms of trade leads to a temporary enlargement of the pool of searchers and if this creates congestion, then a temporary import tariff that slows down the movement of workers into the export sector might actually increase the value of output (measured at world prices). However, our work is unique in at least three respects. First, by using an overlapping generations model in which the congestion externalities are carefully modeled we are able to highlight how the unexpected improvement in the to derive the optimal time path. Indeed, as one referee correctly notes, our two-period overlapping generations framework precludes any deep analysis of this interesting and important issue. 4 For an excellent survey of the early work in this literature see Falvey and Kim (1992) . 5 Of course, if factor markets are distorted there are generally policy instruments that are preferable to tariffs. Thus, complete liberalization coupled with temporary labor market policies targeted at the terms of trade affects the young and old as well as the current and future generations in fundamentally different ways. We consider this to be important, since, as we noted above, there is empirical evidence that concern about the welfare of older workers plays a role in the government's policy choices. Second, we show that there are conditions under which the congestion externalities in our model lead to multiple steady-state equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. As a result, it is possible that with free trade the change in the terms of trade may push the economy into a new steady state characterized by low job acquisition rates and low output in the export sector.
However, if the government intervenes by providing temporary protection to the import-competing sector, the adjustment process may be slowed down enough to steer the economy towards a different steady state that is characterized by higher job acquisition and production rates in the export sector. This leads to the third unique feature of our analysis. In previous work, when the new long run free trade equilibrium is reached, there are no lasting effects from the period of temporary protection. This need not be the case in our model -temporary protection may lead to a permanent change in the allocation of resources and this permanent change may be welfare enhancing.
We present our model and examine the decision problem faced by workers in the next section. We then solve for the steady-state equilibrium and the transition path between equilibria in Section 4, where we also demonstrate how temporary import protection can avert the congestion externality. Since a tariff is distorting, we include a discussion of the costs and benefits associated with a temporary tariff, and argue that it will be welfare improving if the magnitude of the minimum tariff necessary to reduce congestion is relatively small. In Section 5 we turn to the issue of source of the distortions is the optimal policy. It has been pointed out that such policies may be multiple equilibria and show how a temporary tariff can have a permanent effect on the long-run allocation of resources.
An Overlapping Generations Model

A. Assumptions
We consider an overlapping generations model where labor is the only factor of production. There are two goods which we label X (an export good) and M (an importcompeting good). Each worker, regardless of ability, can produce one unit of M per period. By contrast, each worker employed in the export sector can produce a units of output per period. With competitive labor markets, constant returns to scale technology, and no other inputs, each employed worker is paid the value of his or her marginal product, which also equals the total value of his or her production.
We assume that the economy is small, choose the export good as numeraire, and define t P as the exogenously given world price of the import-competing good.
politically infeasible, leaving tariffs as the only way to slow down the adjustment process.
We assume that a worker can always obtain a job in the import-competing sector and keep that job for his or her entire life. By contrast, a worker who wishes to be employed in the export sector must search, and there is some positive probability the worker will not find a job in that sector. We use t π to denote the probability of "success" for a worker searching for a job in the export sector at time t and it is assumed that workers have rational expectations concerning t π .
While we do not explicitly model the search process, what we have in mind is an underlying model in the spirit of the classic work by Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990) in which firms in the export sector post vacancies while workers search for employment. 6 Workers know the number of jobs available and the size of the search pool, but they do not know which firms have unfilled vacancies until they visit them. In such settings, a worker who chooses to search for an export sector job makes it harder for the other searchers in that sector to find employment. These congestion externalities distort incentives and lead to sub-optimal equilibria. Our focus is on how the government can use temporary protection to improve the efficiency of the adjustment process by controlling the rate at which workers switch sectors. Consistent with previous search theoretic models of unemployment, we are assuming that the government possesses the same information as the workers, and thus cannot eradicate the information problem that generates the equilibrium unemployment.
7
The main reason that we do not explicitly model the search process is that its exact nature is not important for our purpose -all that matters is that the congestion 6 See also Diamond (1981 Diamond ( , 1982 Diamond ( and 1984 where the information problems that generate equilibrium unemployment are not explicitly modeled. 7 One way that the government could attack the source of the problem directly is through state-run employment agencies. We follow the standard approach in the search literature by assuming that the government does not do so because it would be prohibitively costly to do so.
externalities are present. 8 This can be captured in a simple manner by assuming that the probability of finding a job in the export sector is a decreasing function of the measure of workers searching for export-sector jobs, as we do in section 3 below.
Carefully modeling the search process itself would greatly complicate the analysis without providing any additional insight.
B. The Worker's Decision Problem
At the start of each period, unemployed workers (including all newborns) must decide whether to accept certain employment in the import-competing sector or search for employment in the export sector. Moreover, each worker who enters the period employed must decide whether to keep their job or look for a job in the other sector.
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The decision for workers in the old generation is simple. Expected one-period income from searching in the export sector at time t is a t π , whereas the certain income of taking a job in the import-competing sector is t P . Assuming risk-neutrality, workers who are not already employed in the export sector with t t P a π ≥ will choose to search for a job in that sector, while the remaining workers will choose to work in the import-competing sector. We define this critical level of ability as o t a and refer to any old worker with this ability as the marginal old worker.
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8 For recent empirical evidence on the existence and magnitude of congestion externalities in the labor market, see Yashiv (2000) . 9 The only people who have the opportunity to switch jobs are those in the middle of their life, who are just turning old 10 Any old worker for whom o t a a = will be indifferent between searching for an export-sector job and taking a job in the import-competing sector. Without loss of generality, we break the tie in favor of search.
The problem for workers in the young generation is more complicated. Define 
If a young searcher achieves success, she earns a while young, and a when old.
12 If the searcher does not find a job, she has the option of searching again when old, or taking a job in the import-competing sector. Similarly, a worker who accepts a job in the import-competing sector earns t P while young, and has the option of searching when old.
We define y t a as the value of ability that equates (1) and (2) a . In Figure 1A , some workers who are young at time t will choose to search for a job in the export sector, but if they are not successful, they will return to the import-competing sector when they become old. These workers have ability
. It is in their interest to "test the waters" of the job market. The potential to receive two periods of high wages is worth giving up one period of low wages. But as they near the end of their work life, the potential to receive higher wages no longer offsets the loss of a single period of low wages.
If the marginal young worker depicted in Figure 1A fails in her search for an export sector job, she will not choose to repeat the search when old. Instead she will choose to accept a job in the import-competing sector. This implies that for this marginal young worker,
. We can now equate (1) and (2) and solve to obtain
The situation depicted in Figure 1B (which increases the probability of a successful search). 
Steady States and Transition Paths
A. The Steady-State Allocation of Resources
. We can combine both possibilities into a single equation:
The second part of (6) can be interpreted as the measure of old searchers who would have gotten a job when young had they searched, and therefore would not be searching when old. Of course, this term is zero if all old searchers also searched when young.
In a steady state, P P t = and π π = t for all t. From our discussion at the end of the last subsection, we can rule out the possibility of delayed search in a steady state.
Therefore, all steady states are characterized by Figure 1A . Let . We note that the steady state measure of searchers in each generation is a function of both P and π . We focus on the relationship between P and the measure of searchers in the remainder of this section, turning to the relationship with π in section 4.
B. An Unexpected Improvement in the Terms of Trade.
Suppose now that there is a permanent, unexpected improvement in the terms of trade. To help keep track of events, we normalize time by setting 1 = t when the terms of trade improve. We can then model a permanent improvement in the terms of trade by assuming that
, where H L P P < . We begin by investigating how this change in world prices affects worker behavior and the value of output.
Intuitively, the improvement in the terms of trade will push some workers out of the import-competing sector to search for jobs in the export sector. As we noted earlier, it is standard to assume congestion externalities exist so that as the pool of searchers swells the probability that an individual worker will find a job falls. This notion is captured by assuming that t π is a decreasing function of S t . While it is natural to think of this function as continuous, doing so complicates our analysis considerably without providing any additional insight. 13 Thus, for illustrative purposes we postulate the following a simple form for this function:
We assume that workers have rational expectations about the time path of t π .
As we show in Section 5, there are cases in which there are multiple rational expectations steady-state equilibria. In addition, there may be more than one rational expectations transition path that leads from the initial steady state equilibrium to the new one. Since we deal with this issue explicitly later in the paper, in this section we focus on the case in which the new steady-state rational expectations equilibrium is unique as is the transition path that leads to it.
To solve for this equilibrium as well as the transition path, we first specify the workers' expectations regarding the time path for t π , and then show that these expectations are consistent with equilibrium behavior. The case that we are interested in is the one in which congestion causes the probability of success to temporarily fall from its steady state value of H π to L π immediately after the improvement in the terms of trade. We then want t π to rises back up to H π in the next period and remain there forever afterward. That is, we assume that
. This set of beliefs will be rational if
The measures of searchers in each of the three periods following the terms of trade shock are depicted in Figure 2 (the detailed derivations for this figure are provided in the Appendix). Since t S (for t = 1-3) is shown as a function of L P for 13 In particular, if the probability of success is a continuous function of S t , we would have to solve a thorny fixed-point problem in order to find equilibrium. In Region I of Figure 2 the change in the terms of trade is dramatic and congestion reduces the probability of finding a job in the export sector. In this case, there are important implications for the distribution of income between current members of the young and old generation, as well as between current and future generations. To sort out how the different groups of workers are affected, it is useful to consider the following four questions as they pertain to the old workers at t = 1: The answers to these four questions are provided in Lemmas 1-4 below.
However, before these lemmas can be stated, we need to introduce some new notation: who are not already employed in the export sector. These workers had planned on taking jobs in the import-competing sector but now search for export sector jobs instead. 16 It is straightforward to show that Second, by the time the clones age the congestion will have abated and the job acquisition rates will have returned to the relatively high value.
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18 For the sake of brevity, we have glossed over an important issue here -the economy does not reach the new steady state until t = 3. Thus, the low job acquisition rates faced by workers at t = 1 have effects on those workers born at t = 2 as well. While these workers are not surprised by the change in the terms of trade, the search pool that they are a part of may be larger than its steady state value. As we show in the next sub-section, a temporary tariff is only effective at relieving congestion if it reduces 1 S below S without increasing 2 S above this value. Thus, effective temporary protection cannot harm these workers.
Proof: The first difference follows directly from the definitions of y ã and y a . The second difference is due to the fact that we are focusing on the rational expectations equilibrium in which the job acquisition rate falls for only one period.
With the aid of Lemmas 1-4, we are now in a position to examine the sort of equity considerations that the government might have in mind when instituting a temporary tariff on the import-competing good. If the decision is based on the welfare of the lowest ability workers, then the government must be primarily concerned with the old workers in this group -the temporary tariff keeps their real incomes from falling as far as they would without protection. Deardorff (1987) , making use of Corden's Social Welfare Function, suggests that this may be one reasonable equity-based explanation for temporary protection. He argues that the government's goal may be to prevent a significant fall in the real income of a significant sector of the economy. However, it should be clear that a temporary tariff could only achieve this goal for the old workers with low ability levels. For the young, a temporary tariff may delay the fall in real income, but it cannot prevent it. If the government truly wanted to use tariffs to prop up the wages of the young workers with low ability levels, it would have to institute a permanent tariff.
It is also unlikely that the government is concerned about the workers with the highest ability levels. While it is true that these workers are harmed by the fall in π when they are old, most of them will already have high-paying jobs in the export sector and will benefit from the lower consumer prices. In addition, these are the workers at the highest end of the income distribution. the congestion is temporary suggests that the policy need not be permanent. While the best policies would be those that directly target the externality, they may not be feasible. We therefore explore the effects of a temporary import tariff.
Suppose that the government levies a specific import tariff (τ ) during the first period, removing it for all subsequent periods. The purpose of the tariff is to keep enough workers from searching in the first period so that the congestion externality is averted. Since congestion is not a problem in the longer run, the tariff is not needed and is therefore removed.
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It will continue to be the case that the economy will be in the new steady state
and therefore the measure of searchers in periods 3 and beyond (both young and old) will remain unchanged. 22 However, the measures of old and young searchers during the first period, and the measures of old searchers during the second period are impacted by the tariff. 23 In Figure 3 , we show how 1 S and 2
S vary with τ, given a price L P and assuming that H t π π = for all t (the derivation of Figure 3 is provided in the Appendix). The measure of period-1 searchers is monotonically decreasing in the tariff. Higher tariff rates make the import-competing sector more attractive and fewer people search. By contrast, very small tariffs have no impact on the measure of searchers in the second period because all searchers who are old in period 2 also searched when young (in period 1). However, for high enough tariffs, some workers will choose to work in the import-competing sector in period 1 when they are young, 21 It is possible to create numeric examples where a smaller tariff levied for two periods can also relieve the congestion externality. It is also conceivable that this could be a more efficient policy than the single-period tariff, since deadweight loss is proportional to the square of the tariff. However, our only purpose in this paper is to show that temporary protection can lead to welfare gains. Solving for the optimal policy is significantly more complex. 22 This follows because the value of the tariff is zero and the price of the import-competing good is at its new steady-state value from period 2 onwards. It folloews that all people born during period 2 make their steady-state choices, as do all people born in subsequent periods. Thus, those who are old in period 3 made their steady-state choices when they were young in period 2. but then search in the export sector when they become old and the tariff is removed.
Higher tariffs increase the measure of these delayed searchers, implying that 2 S is increasing in the tariff rate.
From Figure 3 , there exists a tariff rate (τˆ) such that that can alleviate the congestion externality. Because any tariff is distortionary, the optimal tariff is either zero or τ~.
The Welfare Effects of a Temporary Tariff
A temporary tariff creates both gains and losses. The losses consist of the usual consumption distortion and a production distortion that arises because some workers who would have searched in the absence of the tariff would have found jobs in the export sector, and the value of their output measured at world prices would have been higher than the value of output that they produced in the import-competing sector. The gains occur because all of the workers who continue to search when a temporary tariff is imposed would have also searched in the absence of a tariff.
However, because others are drawn to the import-competing sector and excluded from search, the probability of success for the remaining searchers is higher, therefore increasing the value of output obtained from this group of searchers.
Suppose that we measure the gains and losses as a function of the tariff. for all 1 ≠ t (i.e., congestion is only a problem in period 1)
and that there exists a temporary tariff that the government can use to alleviate the 23 As before, young searchers adjust instantly to any changes in the environment. Therefore the measure of young searchers attains its steady-state value starting in the second period.
congestion. Then, as τ first begins to rise above zero, there are losses from the consumption and production distortions but there are no gains as long as ) ( 1 τ S remains above S . These losses are a continuous, increasing function of τ.
However, as the tariff continues to rise we eventually reach the point where τ τ= and
. 24 At that point, a marginal increase in the tariff creates discrete gains as the job acquisition rate in period 1 jumps up from L π to H π . If these discrete gains dominate the losses accumulated by increasing τ from 0 to τ~, then the temporary tariff is welfare enhancing. It should be clear that this must be the case if the free trade value for 1 S is close to (but above) S . In that case, it takes only a very small tariff to alleviate congestion and boost job acquisition rates in the export sector.
As for the gains and losses, the consumption distortion generated by such a small tariff is of second-order importance, as is the loss due to inducing a very small measure of workers to refrain from search. However, the discrete change from L π to H π applies to all of those workers who continue to search, which is nearly all of the workers who would have searched under free trade. Thus, the gains must dominate the losses.
Multiple Equilibria
Increasing the steady-state job acquisition rate in the export sector has two contradictory effects on the steady-state size of the search pool. First, for each generation the pool broadens to include workers of lesser ability. This effect tends to increase the steady-state measure of searchers. However, given the breadth of 24 Since the increase in τ does not push 2 S above the threshold level (by the definition of τˆ), there are no spillover effects on period 2 searchers -although the search pool increases, it does not increase enough to lower job acquisition rates.
workers who prefer to search for a job in the export sector, a higher success rate leaves fewer old workers unemployed, thereby reducing the steady-state size of the pool. For values of π near one, the second effect dominates and the steady-state measure of searchers is decreasing in the steady-state value of π . Formally:
where the first term on the right hand side of (9) Suppose that the terms of trade unexpectedly improve and that workers correctly anticipate that this will lead to an immediate increase in the size of the search pool.
Suppose further that workers expect the job acquisition rate to fall to π L and remain there permanently. If this is the case the permanent improvement in the terms of trade has pushed the economy into a new steady state with a permanently higher level of search and lower job acquisition rates in the export sector. This provides a new role for the government --it might be possible to use a temporary tariff to keep the economy from moving to the "bad" steady state. If so, the short-run loss associated with the temporary distorting effects of the tariff are likely to be more than offset by a perpetual stream of gains. This would be a situation in which temporary protection would lead to a permanent change in the allocation of resources.
To analyze this situation, we now assume that the probability of successfully finding a job in the export sector falls permanently to L π concurrent with the improvement in the terms of trade. As before, young workers adjust immediately to any change. Since there are no changes in the environment beyond the first period, the steady state measure of young workers is reached immediately. Similarly, it only takes two periods for the measure of old workers to reach its new steady-state value.
In Figure 5 we show the total measure of searchers as a function of L P (note that Of course, we are not the first to point out that externalities in the search process can lead to multiple steady-state equilibria. Diamond (1982 Diamond ( , 1984 and Diamond and Fudenberg (1989) provide models in which positive search externalities may generate this outcome. In their models, workers must search for a trading partner and the fact that more people are trading makes it easier to find a match. If people do not expect many others to search, then it is not in their interest to search and we get an equilibrium with a relatively low level of output. On the other hand, if people expect many others to be searching as well, then their own expected return to search will be high. In this case, we get an equilibrium with a high level of search activity and a relatively high level of output. Diamond and Fudenberg argue that there is a role in their model for the government to try and manipulate expectations in order to steer the economy away from the Pareto-inferior steady state. If, by telling workers to expect a bright future with high production, the government can convince workers to search, the government's projections will turn out to be accurate. It is important to note that such a policy will not work in our setting. To see this, suppose we have an economy that, without government intervention, would be pushed into the bad steady state by the terms of trade shock. Suppose further that the government tried to avoid this outcome by telling workers that job acquisition rates in the export sector would remain high. If workers believed the government, then more of them would be attracted to the export sector, the size of the search pool would grow even larger and job acquisition rates would turn out to be low. Thus, propaganda would not workthe government would have to use a temporary tariff instead.
Conclusion
It has been argued that if governments are going to liberalize trade that they should do so gradually. One of the rationales offered for this is that by doing so the government can smooth out the transition to the new equilibrium and reduce the adjustment costs imposed on workers. Equity concerns have also been raised about how liberalization will affect workers, particularly older ones, who are employed in the protected sector. Similar concerns arise when economies are hit by terms of trade shocks. As a result, governments occasionally provide temporary relief to industries that have been injured by unexpected changes in world prices
In this paper we have presented an overlapping generations model that highlights the manner in which current and future generations are affected by unexpected changes in the terms of trade. We have argued that if the government uses temporary protection due to equity concerns, then their concerns cannot be about the welfare of those workers who remain trapped in the injured sector. Instead, the government must be concerned about two groups --the older workers who regret the decisions made when they were young or who change their labor market behavior as a result of the terms of trade shock, and the young workers who would face low job acquisition rates in the export sector without protection. We have also shown how temporary protection affects the different groups of workers both in the current and future generations.
To capture the notion that adjustment is costly, we have assumed that workers must search for export sector jobs so it takes time for the economy to reach the new steady-state equilibrium. We have shown that if there are congestion externalities present in the search process, temporary protection may be welfare enhancing, reducing adjustment costs for young and old workers alike. This result is not new -it can be found in Karp and Paul (1994) or Gaisford and Leger (2000) . However, a result that is new to this paper is that these congestion externalities can give rise to multiple steady-state equilibria. If this is the case, then a terms of trade shock can permanently push the economy from a "good" steady-state with high job acquisition rates and high output to a "bad" steady state with lower job acquisition and output rates. Government intervention aimed at steering the economy back to the "good" equilibrium is then warranted.
However, propaganda aimed at influencing expectations in not enough. The government must also provide some sort of tangible protection to the injured sector. We have shown that there are cases in which a temporary tariff will do the trick.
Young workers adjust immediately to new circumstances. In particular, they adjust immediately to the simultaneous fall in P and π , and they immediately adjust one more time to the increase in π . This follows since the young workers make all of their decisions after the terms of trade improvement occurs.
In contrast, old workers can be surprised, since the change in price occurs in the middle of their life, after they have committed to a course of action based upon their expectations regarding future prices and labor market conditions. The measure of old searchers in the initial and terminal steady states, as well as those in the intervening period are given in (A.4) -(A.7): Of course, this will not be true for very low values of the tariff. In particular, it will not be true when 0 = τ . However, assuming initially that it is true allows us to solve for the minimum tariff that is consistent with this assumption. 
